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Abstract
According to the United Nations, the world is facing a triple planetary crisis of climate change,
nature (biodiversity) loss, and pollution and waste, with the most egregious consequences felt
by those least responsible. These crises are also intertwined: nature-based solutions are
promoted as climate change solutions even as heat domes fuel forest fires; extraction of
minerals for green energy solutions negatively impacts biodiversity and creates pollution and
waste; and carbon major companies are also among the largest producers of plastic pollution.
International human rights law is increasingly grappling with environmental rights and
responsibilities, as evidenced by the work of special rapporteurs on the environment and on
toxic substances, among others. This paper will consider how business and human rights
instruments could help to guide solutions to triple planetary crisis that are attentive to the need
to reduce overconsumption by the rich while supporting equity and resilience of those most
vulnerable to planetary crisis.
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There are many people who have contributed to my understanding of the ideas explored in this paper, only some
of whom I am able to express gratitude to here. Beyond the BHR community, these include my co-editors of two
books published in 2021, the Cambridge Handbook of Environmental Justice and Sustainable Development
(Sumudu Atapattu and Carmen Gonzalez) and the Research Handbook on Climate Change Law and Loss & Damage
(Meinhard Doelle), as well as our many contributors; members of the Global Network on Human Rights and the
Environment (GNHRE) of which I am director for North America; fellow members of the International Law
Association’s white paper drafting committee on International Law in the Anthropocene; the many collaborators
and research assistants who have contributed to ongoing UNEP-funded research on BHR and environment, with a
focus on climate change, plastics and triple planetary crisis; and colleagues at Dalhousie’s Marine & Environmental
Law Institute (MELAW). My students are an inspiration. And of course, responsibility for the content of the paper
rests with me.
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1. Introduction
According to the United Nations, the world is facing a triple planetary crisis of climate
change, nature (biodiversity) loss, and pollution and waste, with the most egregious
consequences felt by those least responsible.2 These crises are also intertwined. Nature-based
solutions (NbS)3 are promoted as climate change solutions both in terms of mitigation4 and
adaptation5 even as forest fires destroy both local resilience and carbon offsets that are relied
upon by companies to meet their net-zero targets.6 Meanwhile, extraction of minerals for
green energy solutions negatively impacts biodiversity 7 and creates pollution and waste;8 while
the green energy solutions themselves (such as solar panels and electric batteries) lead to
further pollution and waste once they have reached the end of their use.9 Of course, green
solutions are also not human rights-neutral: done well, both NbS and green energy can support
Indigenous and local community self-determination and governance;10 done poorly, climate

2

UNEP, Making Peace with Nature: A Scientific Blueprint to Tackle the Climate, Biodiversity and Pollution
Emergencies (UNEP: Nairobi, 2021). See further https://www.unep.org/resources/making-peace-nature
3 According to WWF, the text of the UNEA 5.2 resolution of March 2, 2022 formally adopted the following
definition of NbS: ‘actions to protect, conserve, restore, sustainably use and manage natural or modified
terrestrial, freshwater, coastal and marine ecosystems, which address social, economic and environmental
challenges effectively and adaptively, while simultaneously providing human well-being, ecosystem services and
resilience and biodiversity benefits.’
https://wwf.panda.org/wwf_news/press_releases/local_press_releases/?5226891/nature-based-solutions-UNEA
4 UNEP & IUCN, Nature-based solutions for climate change mitigation (Nairobi and Gland, 2021), online:
https://www.unep.org/resources/report/nature-based-solutions-climate-change-mitigation
5 UNFCCC, ‘Managing Climate Risks through Nature-based Solutions’ (22 November, 2021),
https://unfccc.int/news/managing-climate-risks-through-nature-based-solutions
6 Camilla Hodgson, ‘US forest fires threaten carbon offsets as company-linked trees burn’ (3 August, 2021)
Financial Times, online: https://www.ft.com/content/3f89c759-eb9a-4dfb-b768-d4af1ec5aa23
7 Sonter, L.J., Dade, M.C., Watson, J.E.M. et al. ‘Renewable energy production will exacerbate mining threats to
biodiversity’. Nat Commun11, 4174 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-17928-5
8 Jaya Nayar, ‘Not So “Green” Technology: The Complicated Legacy of Rare Earth Mining” (12 August 2021)
Harvard International Review, online: https://hir.harvard.edu/not-so-green-technology-the-complicated-legacy-ofrare-earth-mining/
9 Atalay Atasu, Serasu Duran, and Luk N Van Wassenhove, ‘The Dark Side of Solar Power’ (18 June 2021) Harvard
Business Review online: https://hbr.org/2021/06/the-dark-side-of-solar-power; Gregory Barber & Aarian Marshall,
‘Cars Are Going Electric. What Happens to the Used Batteries?” (2 November, 2021) Wired, online:
https://www.wired.com/story/cars-going-electric-what-happens-used-batteries/
10 Stephanie Wood, “Meet the Cheakamus, the only community forest to develop carbon offsets in B.C.” (August
14, 2021), The Narwhal, online: https://thenarwhal.ca/bc-forests-carbon-offsets-cheakamus/ and Lindsay Jones,
“Could 80,000 family woodlot owners be the key to saving the Acadian forest?” (September 19, 2020), The
Narwhal, online: https://thenarwhal.ca/acadian-forest-climate-change/ [both part of ‘Carbon Cache’ series on
NbS in Canada: https://thenarwhal.ca/topics/carbon-cache/ ]; Adrian A Smith & Dayna Nadine Scott, ‘Energy
without Injustice? Indigenous Participation in Renewable Energy Generation’ in Sumudu Atapattu, Carmen G.
Gonzalez & Sara L Seck, co-editors, Cambridge Handbook of Environmental Justice and Sustainable Development
(CUP 2021) 383.

pg. 2

solutions can be human rights-violating.11 The same lessons hold for terrestrial and oceanbased climate solutions, including carbon dioxide removal (CDR), whether NbS or technological.
Attention to the relationship between business and human rights (BHR), and
environmental problems, has increased in recent years, with particular attention of late to the
nexus between BHR and climate change.12 This attention has been fueled in part by the Petition
brought by Greenpeace Philippines in 2015 before the Commission on Human Rights of the
Philippines requesting an investigation into the responsibility of the Carbon Major companies
for human rights violations arising from the impacts of climate change. 13 The Petition relied
upon the business responsibility to respect human rights under the UN Guiding Principles,14 as
well as climate attribution studies by Richard Heede that traced ‘the lion’s share of cumulative
CO2 and methane emissions since the industrial revolution’ to a list of ‘multinational and stateowned producers of crude oil, natural gas, coal, and cement’. 15 More recently, the Royal Dutch
Shell PLC (RDS) decision of the Hague District Court from May 2021 relied upon the business
responsibility to respect human rights from the UNGPs in ordering RDS to reduce emissions
across all three scopes in accordance with the Paris Agreement.16

11

Statnett SF v Sør-Fosen sijte Supreme Court judgment 11 October 2021, HR-2021-1975-S (case no. 20143891SIC-HRET, co no. 20-143892-SIV-HRET and case no. 20-143892SIV-HRET) [finding that wind farm
development interfered with Sami reindeer herders’ right to enjoy their own culture]; Forest Peoples Programme,
‘Re-thinking nature-based solutions: seeking transformative change through culture and rights’, Briefing Note,
online: https://www.forestpeoples.org/sites/default/files/documents/Re-thinking%20naturebased%20solutions_Seeking%20transformative%20change%20through%20culture%20and%20rights_0.pdf
12 See for example OHCHR, Human Rights, Climate Change, and Business: Key Messages, online:
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/materials/KMBusiness.pdf. For a sample of the
scholarly literature, see for example Sara L Seck, “Climate Change, Corporate Social Responsibility, and the
Extractive Industries” (2018) 33:1 Journal of Environmental Law and Practice 271; K Toft, ‘Climate Change as a
Business and Human Rights Issue: A Proposal for a Moral Typology’ (2020) 5(1) Business and Human Rights
Journal, 5(1), 1-27; Chira Macchi, ‘The Climate Change Dimension of Business and Human Rights: The Gradual
Consolidation of a Concept of ‘Climate Due Diligence’’ (2021) 6(1) Business and Human Rights Journal, 6(1), 93119; Claire Bright & Karin Buhmann, “Risk-Based Due Diligence, Climate Change, Human Rights, and the Just
Transition” (2021) 13 Sustainability, online: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/18/10454; Chiara Macchi &
Nadia Bernez, “Business, Human Rights and Climate Due Diligence: Understanding the Responsibility of Banks”
(2021) 13(15) Sustainability online: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/15/8391; Sara L. Seck, “A relational
analysis of enterprise obligations and carbon majors for climate justice” Oñati Socio-Legal Series: (2021) 11:1
Climate Justice in the Anthropocene https://opo.iisj.net/index.php/osls/article/view/1217;
13 See description and analysis of the petition in Sara L. Seck. "Revisiting Transnational Corporations and Extractive
Industries: Climate Justice, Feminism, and State Sovereignty" (2017) 26:2 Transnational Law & Contemporary
Problems 383 at 394-413.
14 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and
Remedy’ Framework, UN doc. A/HRC/17/31 (March 21, 2011).
15 See discussion of Heede studies as relied upon in the Philippines Petition, ibid, 395-396. See also Climate
Accountability https://climateaccountability.org
16 Milieudefensie et al v Royal Dutch Shell PLC, ECLI-NL-RBDHA-2021-5339, Rechtbank Den Haag, C-09-571932 - HA
ZA 19-379 (engelse versie).
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By contrast, there has been less explicit attention given to the relationship between BHR
and the biodiversity crisis,17 or BHR and pollution and waste18 beyond the resource extraction
context.19 The global plastics crisis has recently been in the news with a March 2022 resolution
of the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA-5) committing to the negotiation of a
legally binding agreement20 that would be ‘based on a comprehensive approach that addresses
the full lifecyle of plastic’21 and not limited to the marine context. While the human rights
implications of the plastics life cycle have been clarified in recent reports by UNEP22 as well as a
2021 report of the Special Rapporteur on human rights and toxic substances, 23 there has to
date been little consideration given to the BHR dimensions of this crisis,24 by comparison to the
extensive resources exploring circular economy solutions.25 Yet the plastics problem has grave
implications not only for terrestrial and marine ecosystems, but also for people, and even the
climate system. 26 Notably, carbon major companies are also among the largest producers of

17

UNEP & OHCHR, “Human Rights and Biodiversity: Key Messages”, (Message 08), online:
https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/35407/KMBio.pdf
18 UNEP & OHCHR, “Human Rights and Hazardous Substances: Key Messages”(Messages 03 and 06), online:
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/materials/KMHazardousSubstances25febLight.pdf
19 There literature on BHR and mining is extensive. Transboundary movements of hazardous wastes is also an area
that has received attention. See for example cases discussed in Amnesty International, Injustice Incorporated:
Corporate abuses and the human rights to remedy (2014), online:
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol30/001/2014/en/
20 UNEP Press release, 02 March 2022, ‘Historic day in the campaign to beat plastic pollution: Nations commit to
develop a legally binding agreement’ online: https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/press-release/historic-daycampaign-beat-plastic-pollution-nations-commit-develop.
21 See further text of adopted resolution: End plastic pollution: Towards an internationally legally binding
instrument, UNEP/EA.5/L.23/Rev.1, 2 March 2022, para 3. The text continues: ‘taking into account among other
things, the principles of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, as well as national circumstances
and capabilities’. It then lists 16 aspects that would be covered by treaty provisions.
22 See for example SEA circular issue brief 01 ‘A human rights-based approach to preventing plastic pollution’,
online: https://www.sea-circular.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/UNEP-COBSEA-SEA-circular_Issue-Brief-01_Ahuman-rights-based-approach-to-preventing-plastic-pollution.pdf ; UNEP, COBSEA, SEI, Marine Plastic Litter in East
Asian Seas – Gender, Human Rights and Economic Dimensions (2019), online: https://www.sea-circular.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/11/SEI_SEA-circular-1.pdf; and UNEP, AZUL, Neglected – Environmental justice Impacts of
Marine Litter and Plastic Pollution (2021), online:
https://wedocs.unep.org/xmlui/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/35417/EJIPP.pdf
23 Marcos Orellana, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Implications for Human Rights of the Environmentally
Sound Management and Disposal of Hazardous Substances and Wastes: The stages of the plastics cycle and their
impacts on human rights, UNGA, Human Rights Council, 76th Sess, UN Doc A/76/207 (22 July 2021), online:
https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2F76%2F207&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop
24 But see Marine & Environmental Law Institute, "Plastics Toolbox: Business, Human Rights, and the Environment"
(last updated November 2021) (Dalhousie University, Schulich School of Law), online:
https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/bhreplastics/1/ . The compilation of this toolbox, which will be updated
in 2022, was funded by UNEP.
25 See for example Ellen MacArthur Foundation, ‘Plastics and the Circular Economy’ Archive:
https://archive.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/explore/plastics-and-the-circular-economy
26 Center for International Environmental Law, Plastic & Climate: The Hidden Costs of a Plastic Planet (2019) online:
https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Plastic-and-Climate-FINAL-2019.pdf
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plastic pollution. Indeed, a study by the Minderoo Foundation identified 100 companies as the
producers of 90% of single-use plastic waste, with Exxon Mobile in top place. 27
Beyond the interdependent nature of climate change (including ocean acidification),
biodiversity loss (terrestrial & marine), and pollution and waste (including plastics), is the
concern that existing tools are not working quickly or effectively enough given the urgency of
the planetary crisis. Coinciding with the celebrations over the resolution on a future plastics
treaty was dismay at the release of the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC)’s Sixth Assessment Report on Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.28 Among
the conclusions presented in the Summary for Policymakers is that there have already been
irreversible impacts on both natural and human systems that have been unable to adapt to
climate extremes, and that the people disproportionately affected are those most vulnerable.29
The report further confirms that vulnerability of people to climate change is driven by ‘patterns
of intersecting socio-economic development, unsustainable ocean and land use, inequity,
marginalization, historical and ongoing patterns of inequity such as colonialism, and
governance.’30 Vulnerability of both people and ecosystems are interdependent, and
unsustainable development patterns increase exposure to climate hazards, with over 3 billion
people living in highly vulnerable contexts.31 If global warming can be kept to close to 1.5
degrees, projected losses and damages from climate change can be substantially reduced, but
not eliminated.32 Given the important role that biodiversity and ecosystems play in climate
adaptation and mitigation, they must be safeguarded at a global scale for ‘climate resilient
development’.33 If greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions do not ‘rapidly decline’, the prospect of
climate resilient development is increasingly limited.34
What is to be done?35 As frustration grows over the slow pace – or inability – of the
climate regime to solve the climate crisis, new studies are drawing attention to a different way
of thinking about solutions, focusing on the problem of overconsumption. An aptly worded
media post by Jag Bhalla in February 2021 following the release of the 2020 United Nations
Emissions Gap Report summed up the problem this way: ‘How the right to pursue happiness

27

Plastic Waste Makers Index, ‘Top 100 Polymer Producers’ online: https://www.minderoo.org/plastic-wastemakers-index/data/indices/producers/
28 IPCC Sixth Assessment Report, Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, (Working Group II),
online: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/
29 IPCC Sixth Assessment Report, Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, (Working Group II),
Summary for Policymakers, at SPM.B.1, online:
https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6wg2/pdf/IPCC_AR6_WGII_SummaryForPolicymakers.pdf
30 Ibid at SPM.B.2
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid at SPM.B.3.
33 Ibid at SPM.D.4.
34 Ibid.
35 Especially as the world is confronted by war in the Ukraine and beyond. My sense is that the overconsumption of
the affluent issue underlies these conflicts but it is beyond my present ability to elaborate.
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through unlimited consumption harms the planet, and our kids’.36 This issue was starkly raised
as media highlighted the irony of private jets flying participants to COP26 in Glasgow. 37
This purpose of this paper is to explore whether BHR has anything to offer the problem of
overconsumption by the ‘affluent’ in light of the interconnected triple planetary crisis.38
Overproduction and overconsumption may not have an obvious connection to ‘human rights’.
But it is now commonly accepted that ‘climate change directly and indirectly interferes with the
enjoyment of all human rights’ and exacerbates inequalities,39 that all hazardous substances
have an adverse effect on human rights including the rights to health and life,40 and that
thriving biodiversity and healthy ecosystems are essential for the fulfilment of many human
rights.41 As overconsumption contributes to climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution and
waste, overconsumption is a BHR issue. But can BHR tools assist?
The paper will proceed as follows. First, I will explore the problem of overconsumption from
a triple planetary crisis perspective. I will then explore possible approaches to the problem,
beginning with litigation using the example of the RDS case, then turning to the European
Commission’s proposal for a Directive on corporate sustainability due diligence,42 followed by
reflection on the SDGs, and concluding with consideration of the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises’ responsible business conduct (RBC) approach of risk-based due
diligence including the role of consumers. I will then turn to insights from human rights and
environment frameworks developed by special rapporteurs on human rights and the
environment,43 to explore whether these might offer insights into BHR solutions to the
overconsumption problem. I conclude by contemplating alternate pathways, drawing in part on
previous work.

2. The Problem of Overconsumption

36

Jag Bhalla, ‘What’s your “fair share” of carbon emissions? You’re probably blowing way past it.’ (24 February
2021), Vox, online: https://www.vox.com/22291568/climate-change-carbon-footprint-greta-thunberg-unemissions-gap-report.
37 See for example the outrage over private jets being used to fly the ‘elite’ to COP26 as reported in various media
sources: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10152027/Hypocrite-airways-Jeff-Bezoss-48m-gulf-streamleads-parade-400-private-jets.html
38 Conversations about overconsumption are often countered with reference to overpopulation. This paper will not
delve into this debate, taking the position that affluence, especially the affluence of the 1% and 10% is a real issue,
even if technology enables increases in efficiency. For a quick overview of the debate, see
https://theconversation.com/population-is-only-part-of-the-environmental-impact-equation-4009;
39 OHCHR, Human Rights, Climate Change, and Business: Key Messages, p1, online:
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/materials/KMBusiness.pdf.
40 Key messages, toxics, p1
41 Key messages, biodiversity, p1
42 https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/proposal-directive-corporate-sustainable-due-diligence-and-annex_en
43 https://www.ohchr.org/en/Issues/environment/SRenvironment/Pages/SRenvironmentIndex.aspx See also the
work of the Special rapporteur for toxic substances:
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Environment/SRToxicsandhumanrights/Pages/Index.aspx
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As will be explored below, while Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 1244 points to the
importance of ensuring sustainable consumption and production patterns, SDG 1345 on Climate
Action has nothing to say about excess emissions by the wealthy. On the other hand, the link
between climate change, human rights, and inequality in consumption patterns was highlighted
in the 2019 report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty, who noted the perversity that
‘the richest people’ are both ‘responsible for and have benefited from the vast majority of
[GHG] emissions’ and ‘have the greatest capacity to adapt’; meanwhile those most harmed are
the poorest, ‘who have contributed the least to emissions and have the least capacity to
react.’46 Relying on a 2015 report by Oxfam, the Special Rapporteur noted:
‘The poorest half of the world’s population – 3.5 billion people – is responsible for just 10
per cent of the carbon emissions, while the richest 10 per cent are responsible for a full half.
A person in the wealthiest 1 per cent uses 175 times more carbon than one in the bottom
10 per cent.’47
Further studies have confirmed and expanded on this assessment in the climate context,
increasingly squarely pointing the finger at the problem of individual overconsumption – or
excess emissions – especially of the ‘rich’ as a key part of the problem.48
Most recently, according to Chapter 6, ‘Global Carbon Inequality’ of the 2022 World Inequality
Report49:
Global income and wealth inequalities are tightly connected to ecological inequalities
and to inequalities in contribution to climate change. On average humans emit 6.6
tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2) per capita and per year. Our novel dataset on
44

https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal12
https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal13
46 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights: Climate change and poverty, UNGA
A/HRC/41/39 (17 July 2019) para 14, online:
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Poverty/Pages/ClimateChange.aspx
47 Ibid para 14, referencing Oxfam, “World’s richest 10% produce half of carbon emissions while poorest 3.5 billion
account for just a tenth”, 2 December 2015.
48 See for example the analysis of UNEP’s 2020 Emissions Gap Report data as described in Vox:
https://www.vox.com/22291568/climate-change-carbon-footprint-greta-thunberg-un-emissions-gap-report .
According to this data, the top 1% global income group have incomes greater than $109,000 USD, while the top
10% have income levels above $38,000. To reach their ‘fair share’ of carbon, they would need to reduce their
emissions by 97% and 91% respectively. See further UNEP Emissions Gap Report, (9 December 2020),
https://www.unep.org/emissions-gap-report-2020 (especially Chapter 6 ‘Bridging the Gap – the role of equitable
low-carbon lifestyles’). See also Oxfam & Stockholm Environment Institute, 2020 study https://www.sei.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/09/research-report-carbon-inequality-era.pdf; https://grist.org/equity/carbon-emissioninequality-in-2021/ ; https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20211025-climate-how-to-make-the-rich-pay-for-theircarbon-emissions ;
49 World Inequality Report 2022, online: https://wir2022.wid.world (see chapter 6, Global Carbon Inequality
https://wir2022.wid.world/chapter-6/ ) According to Figure 6.5a, ‘Personal carbon footprints include emissions
from domestic consumption, public and private investments, as well as imports and exports of carbon embedded
in goods and services traded with rest of the world.’
45
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carbon emissions inequalities reveals important inequalities in CO2 emissions at the
world level: the top 10% of emitters are responsible for close to 50% of all emissions,
while the bottom 50% make 12% of the total.
These inequalities are not just a rich vs. poor country issue. There are high emitters in
low and middle income countries and low emitters in rich countries. In Europe, the
bottom 50% of the population emits around 5 tonnes per year and per person; the
bottom 50% in East Asia emits around 3 tonnes and the bottom 50% in North America
around 10 tonnes. This contrasts sharply with emission levels of the top 10% in these
regions (27 in Europe, 34 in East Asia and 69 tonnes in North America).
This report also reveals that the poorest half of the population in rich countries is
already at (or near) climate 2030 climate targets set by rich countries, when these
targets are expressed on a per capita basis. This is not the case for the top half of the
population. Large inequalities in emissions suggest that climate policies should target
wealthy polluters more. So far, climate policies such as carbon taxes have often
disproportionately impacted low and middle income groups,50 while leaving
consumption habits of wealthiest groups unchanged.
Notably, the report observes that since 1990, the per capita emissions of the global top 1%
have increased substantially, whereas for poorer groups within rich countries emissions have
decreased.51 Troublingly, this time period aligns with the existence of the international climate
regime. The proposed solutions to the problems identified in this report include ensuring
appropriate data collection within states of carbon inequality, implementation of progressive
wealth tax strategies, and taxation of carbon assets.52 The chapter also points to the highly
problematic emissions associated with space travel, an example of ‘extreme pollution’ engaged
in by the ‘ultra-wealthy’: ‘It therefore takes a few minutes in space travel to emit at least as
much carbon as an individual from the bottom billion emit in her entire lifetime.’ 53
As discussed above, the climate crisis is inextricably intertwined with the plastic
pollution problem. Indeed, a study by the Minderoo Foundation identified 100 companies as
the producers of 90% of single-use plastic waste, with Exxon Mobile in top place. 54 Plastics are
also major contributors to global GHG emissions. 55 Might the ‘rich’ also play a disproportionate
role in plastic consumption? According to the OECD’s recently published Global Plastics
50

The authors note that this observation depends on the structure of the carbon tax or carbon pricing mechanism
and so the disproportionate impact on lower income groups is not universally applicable.
51 WIR 2022, chapter 6
52 Ibid. See also https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2021/11/23/missing-from-cop26-lifestylechoices-of-middle-class-and-rich-consumers/
53 WIR 2022, chapter 6, text at note 25.
54 Plastic Waste Makers Index, ‘Top 100 Polymer Producers’ online: https://www.minderoo.org/plastic-wastemakers-index/data/indices/producers/
55 Center for International Environmental Law, Plastic & Climate: The Hidden Costs of a Plastic Planet (2019) online:
https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Plastic-and-Climate-FINAL-2019.pdf
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Outlook: Economic Drivers, Environmental Impacts and Policy Options,56 global use of plastics
has quadrupled in the last 30 years, and the COVID-19 pandemic has led to increased use in
terms of personal protective equipment, restaurant take-away, and online retail shopping.57
OECD countries and China account for two-thirds of current plastics use (20% China; 18% US;
18% OECD Europe; 9% other OECD).58 Data on plastic use per capita is also available in the
OECD report, noting that a key driver of plastics use is GDP: per capita plastics use globally is
60.1 kg, while for OECD countries it is 155.8kg and non-OECD countries 39.2kg. The USA
(255.2kg) and Canada (202.2kg) are by far the highest per capita users of plastic, while African
countries (excluding North Africa) are the least (15.9kg).59 However, data on plastics use by
individuals based on wealth measures within countries appears lacking in this report and
elsewhere. (Additional data in the OECD report examines plastic waste, materials, industry
context, and transboundary movements).
What about biodiversity? While individual ecological footprint calculations 60 have been
around for a while, I am not aware of a comparative data set for individual biodiversity or
nature loss inequality, although data is available for country comparisons.61 I am also not
aware of individual data on pollution and waste, although individual plastics 62 and water63
footprint calculators do. Recent studies have drawn attention more generally to the link
between ‘affluence’, resource use, and pollutants, concluding that the ‘affluent citizens of the
world are responsible for most environmental impacts and are central to any future prospect of
retreating to safer environmental conditions.’ 64 Biophysical resource use is driven by ‘highly
affluent consumers’ whether in a direct manner through high consumption, or by driving

56

OECD, Global Plastics Outlook: Economic Drivers, Environmental Impacts and Policy Options (2022) online:
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment/global-plastics-outlook_de747aef-en
57 OECD ibid (section 2.2)
58 OECD ibid (section 2.2). [Also, confirm how this report treats plastics used in manufacturing/transport from
China to developed countries?]
59 OECD ibid (section 2.2, Table 2.4). See also data on plastics intensity relative to GDP.
60 See Global Footprint Network, ‘Biodiversity’, online: https://www.footprintnetwork.org/biodiversity/ . See also
CBD, Global Biodiversity Outlook 5, 2020 https://www.cbd.int/gbo/gbo5/publication/gbo-5-en.pdf
61 See https://data.footprintnetwork.org/?_ga=2.223305874.806409058.1645994373-718436783.1645994373#/
‘An ecological deficit occurs when the Ecological Footprint of a population exceeds the biocapacity of the area
available to that population. A national ecological deficit means that the nation is importing biocapacity through
trade, liquidating national ecological assets or emitting carbon dioxide waste into the atmosphere. An ecological
reserve exists when the biocapacity of a region exceeds its population’s Ecological Footprint.’ See also biocapacity
per capita calculations: https://data.footprintnetwork.org/?_ga=2.223305874.806409058.1645994373718436783.1645994373#/ See also 2017 study entitled ‘Quantifying Biodiversity Losses Due to Human
Consumption: A Global-Scale Footprint Analysis’ https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acs.est.6b05296
62 Plastics footprint calculators https://www.earthday.org/plastic-pollution-calculator-2/ and
https://www.omnicalculator.com/ecology/plastic-footprint
63 Water footprint calculators https://www.watercalculator.org and
https://waterfootprint.org/en/resources/interactive-tools/personal-water-footprint-calculator/
64 Widmann, Lenzen, Keysser & Steinberger, “Scientists’ warning on affluence’ (2020) Nature Communications
11:3107 https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-16941-y at 1.
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‘consumption norms’.65 Among solutions proposed is the need to transform economic systems
to support ‘business models that encourage sharing and giving economies, based on
cooperation, communities and localised economies instead of competition.’ 66
My claim is that data on global consumption patterns and implications for triple
planetary crisis, with particular attention to overconsumption by the affluent, is important if we
are to develop effective solutions to triple planetary crisis, including equitable solutions that are
also perceived as legitimate.67 It is also relevant to the question of whether – or not – BHR can
serve as a meaningful tool for addressing the urgent global ecological challenges of today.
Despite the evidence put forward earlier in this paper that triple planetary crisis has grave
implications for human rights, BHR to date appears to have had little if anything to offer with
regard to the problem of overproduction to feed the overconsumption of the affluent. Indeed,
businesses as tools of capitalist production especially when understood to be driven by
shareholder primacy norms and profit-maximization appear doomed to fail. There is a definite
push for businesses to adopt ‘green’ production patterns through circular economy models and
‘zero waste’ ambitions so as to minimize ecological footprints, but this push is coming primarily
from business sustainability movements and does not seem to confront overconsumption,
focusing instead of intensification and efficiency. This is of course extremely important work.
But does BHR68 have anything to offer to the problem of overconsumption?

3. Human rights-based Climate Litigation
The international climate regime focuses attention on the GHG emissions of states and
embedded within the UNFCCC and subsequent agreements is the distinction between the
responsibilities of developed and developing states on the basis of common but differentiated
responsibilities and capabilities in accordance with principles of international environmental
law.69 As noted above, an alternate lens is that of the carbon major enterprise, with climate
attribution studies pointing to the responsibilities of a small number of carbon major
enterprises over time.70 Subsequent climate litigation has relied upon these studies to ground
claims in court and before human rights tribunals, yet the focus of this litigation has largely
65

Ibid at 3. It is worth noting the development of biodiversity disclosures for businesses. See for example CDSB
Framework, ‘Application guidance for biodiversity-related disclosures’ (November 2021) online:
https://ccli.ubc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Application-guidance-for-biodiversity-related-dislcosures.pdf
66 Ibid at 8.
67 See for example the outrage over private jets being used to fly the ‘elite’ to COP26 as reported in various media
sources: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10152027/Hypocrite-airways-Jeff-Bezoss-48m-gulf-streamleads-parade-400-private-jets.html
68 A quick text search of the BHRJ for the word ‘overconsumption’ pulled up 0 articles; whereas ‘consumption’
pulled up 20. At a glance, none seem to address the issues raised here more than in passing. [but I could be wrong]
69 See Patricia Galvao Ferreira, “Differentiation in International Environmental Law: Has Pragmatism Displaced
Considerations of Justice?” in Neil Craik, Cameron Jefferies, Sara L Seck, &Timothy Stephens (editors), Global
Environmental Change and Innovation in International Law (CUP, 2018) 21-41; Nathalie Chalifour, ‘Equity
Considerations in Loss and Damage” in Meinhard Doelle and Sara L Seck (editors), Research Handbook on Climate
Change Law and Loss & Damage (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021) 18-42.
70 See above
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been on western investor-owned enterprises, leaving aside the responsibility of state-owned or
nation state enterprises despite these being highlighted in the research.71 For the purpose of
this paper, these cases also render invisible the contributions of individuals, especially the rich,
and so do not point the finger squarely at the problem of individual overconsumption.
To start, it is worth reflecting on the RDS climate case. The RDS case is regarded as
particularly significant not only because it is the first time that a court has ordered a company
rather than a government to reduce emissions but for having included Scope 3 emissions within
RDS’s responsibility – including, for example, the fossil fuel-related emissions of energy
products purchased by customers and emitted when driving their own cars. 72 That it was able
to do so reflects in part existing practices by multinational enterprises like Shell that report on
their GHG emissions in accordance with GHG accounting standards developed by non-state
initiatives such as the World Resources Institute (WRI) and World Business Council for
Sustainable Development (WBCSD)’s Greenhouse Gas Protocol (GHG Protocol), dating from
2001.73 However, this case is under appeal, and RDS has moved its head office out of the
Netherlands.74 More concerningly for the purpose of this paper, it is not at all clear what the
impact of Shell’s compliance with the court’s order would be on the prevention of climate
harms in the global context. Ultimately, as RDS ‘determines the energy package of the Shell
group – and consequently, the range of energy products’, the court suggested that beyond its
current obligations, RDS is ‘free to decide not to make new investments in explorations and
fossil fuels, and to change the energy package offered by the Shell group, such as the reduction
pathways require …’75 Crucially, the design of the reduction obligation is left entirely up to
Shell,76 so it is unclear what practical oversight the court can undertake aside from a review of
Shell’s GHG emissions reporting ostensibly undertaken at its (former?) head office in the
Netherlands.

71

See for example the 2019 update (1965-2017) to Heede’s work, which puts Saudi Aramco in first place, Gazprom
in third following Chevron in second place, and the National Iranian Oil Co in fifth place, behind ExxonMobil but
ahead of BP and Shell. Coal India, PEMEX, Petroleos de Venezuela, PetroChina and Peabody Energy round out the
top 10. See https://climateaccountability.org/carbonmajors.html See further discussion of this point in Lisa
Benjamin & Sara Seck, ‘The Escalating Risks of Climate Litigation for Corporations’ in Larry W Thorpe, Peter F
McLaughlin, and Sarah E McMillan, editors, (Fall 2021) Vol 18 No 1 The SciTechLawyer, A Publication of the
American Bar Association Science & Technology Law Section 10-14.
72 See eg Maxine Joselow, “Court orders Shell to slash emissions in historic ruling” May 27, 2021 Scientific
American https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/court-orders-shell-to-slash-emissions-in-historic-ruling/;
Joanna Setzer and Catherine Highman (2021) Global trends in climate change litigation: 2021 snapshot (Grantham
Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy,
London School of Economics and Political Science, London) at 31. [Add Benjamin/Seck in ABA?]
73 See Greenhouse Gas Protocol, https://ghgprotocol.org/about-us
74 Laura Hurst and Diederik Baazil, ‘Shell to drop ‘Dutch’ from name, relocate HQ to London’ (15 November 2021)
Bloomberg, Aljazeera, online: https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2021/11/15/bb-shell-to-drop-dutch-fromname-relocate-hq-to-london
75 RDS Decision 4.4.25 (It is through the energy package that RDS ‘controls and influences the Scope 3 emissions of
the end-users of the products produced and sold by the Shell group.’).
76 RDS Decision para 4.1.4 (‘taking account of its current obligations and other relevant circumstances.’)
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For the climate concerned, this may seem surprisingly underwhelming, when compared to
an indication from the court that the Shell group should (must) refrain from any new fossil fuel
investments or even remedy past climate harms as a climate justice approach would require. 77
Indeed, the court is clear that the CO2 emissions of the Shell group are not currently unlawful,
despite the plaintiffs’ claim.78 At another point in the judgment the court suggests that a
consequence of setting the emissions reduction guideline at net 45% lower than 2019 levels (a
‘significant obligation’) ‘may be that RDS will forgo new investments in the extraction of fossil
fuels and/or will limit its production of fossil fuels.’79 The explanation for this underwhelming
order lies in the analysis of reduction pathways and the acceptance of ‘negative emissions’ –
that is, ‘processes that extract [GHGs] from the atmosphere, such as a combination of capturing
biomass and storing CO2’.80 The court did not accept the plaintiffs’ argument that to reach net
zero by 2050 requires ‘an absolute reduction of 45% in 2030’ – rather, while acknowledging
that scenarios involving ‘large-scale negative emissions’ are unacceptable, ‘there must be room
for scenarios with negative emissions.’81
Nature-based solutions (NbS) are promoted as important negative emissions technologies,
having the potential to address both climate change and biodiversity loss concerns at the same
time, yet are open to misuse and greenwashing,82 and can themselves give rise to human rights
abuses.83 The purchase of NbS to offset emissions rather than significantly reducing emissions is
a serious concern, and one that is arguably exacerbated from a jurisdictional perspective if the
NbS proposed is in a different jurisdiction from that of the court issuing the order to reduce
emissions. On the facts of RDS, the order issued was ‘declared provisionally enforceable’ 84 but
absent from the decision is how - and where – actions need to be taken, leaving this up to RDS
to decide, and presumably report. 85
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Notably, the RDS court denied standing to a Dutch NGO that’s focus of concern was the impact of climate
change in Africa, whereas Dutch NGOs concerned about climate impacts in the Netherlands were granted
standing. RDS Decision 4.21 – 4.26. On BHR and climate justice, see Sara L. Seck, “A relational analysis of enterprise
obligations and carbon majors for climate justice” (2021) 11:1 Oñati Socio-Legal Series 254-284: Climate Justice in
the Anthropocene.
78 RDS Decision 4.5.7
79 RDS Decision 4.4.39.
80 RDS Decision 4.4.30.
81 RDS Decision 4.4.30
82 Nature-based Solutions Initiative, ‘On the misuse of nature-based carbon offsets’ (2021)
https://www.naturebasedsolutionsinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Greenwashing-response-finalversion.pdf
83 Ibid, and Forest Peoples Programme, above note 11. See also UNPRI, ‘New investor guide to negative emission
technologies and land use’ (26 October 2020), online: https://www.unpri.org/news-and-press/new-investor-guideto-negative-emission-technologies-and-land-use/6655.article
84 RDS Decision at para 4.5.7
85 Indeed, a New Zealand court expressed concern over an action seeking an injunction that would require GHG
emitting companies to produce or cause zero emissions by 2030, linearly reducing net emissions each year, as
supervising the injunction including the acceptability of offsets would turn the court into a regulator but without
the requisite expertise. Smith v Fontera Co-Operative Group Ltd and Ors [2020] NZHC 419 at paras 107-108.
[update to Court of Appeal?]
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As a result, while human rights-based climate litigation drawing upon the UNGPs gives
cause of excitement, it should also be tempered with a reality check. Litigation is likely easier
against investor-owned companies, than state-owned or nation-state producers, and so this
can only ever be a small piece of the puzzle. Moreover, a focus on emissions reduction without
attention to the problem of offsets including NbS can create incentives for ‘climate-washing’86
rather than meaningful climate action.

4. Mandatory HReDD
A different BHR tool is mandatory human rights (and environmental) due diligence
(mandatory HReDD). The recently released European Commission proposal provides food for
thought here.87 First, this Directive proposal needs to be understood in light of existing and
proposed complementary initiatives, including a proposed regulation on supply chains and
deforestation, a proposed regulation for new batteries, a sustainable products initiative aimed
at revising an existing ecodesign directive, among many existing environmental initiatives and
non-financial disclosure initiatives.88 There is also the domestic legal context to consider, and
indeed the purpose of this initiative appears in part to ensure a level playing field across the EU
for due diligence, and to improve legal certainty.89
Given the purpose of this paper, my observations with regard to this initiative will be brief
and focused. The purpose of the Directive as set out in Article 1 is to set rules with regard to the
due diligence obligations of companies with attention to their own operations, subsidiaries, and
value chain operations; the focus of the due diligence is on both actual and potential human
rights and environmental adverse impacts, and appropriate liability rules in case of violation.90
Article 15 asks Member States to ensure select companies adopt a plan setting out a business
model and strategy for the company that is compatible with limiting global warming in line with
the Paris Agreement and transition to a sustainable economy.91 The Annex contains lists that
specify the adverse environmental and human rights impacts relevant to the Directive,
classified separately.
Article 15 is subtitled ‘Combating climate change’ and clarifies that companies are to
identify in their plan ‘on the basis of information reasonably available to the company, the
extent to which climate change is a risk for, or an impact of, the company’s operations’. 92
Where climate change ‘is or should have been identified as a principal risk for, or a principal
impact of, the company’s operations’, Member States are to ensure that ‘the company includes
86

See for example re climate-washing cases https://www.reuters.com/business/sustainablebusiness/environmental-groups-sue-totalenergies-over-climate-marketing-claims-2022-03-03/
87 Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on Corporate Sustainability
Due Diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937, Brussels, 23.2.2022, COM(2022) 71 final, 2022/0051 (COD)
88 Proposed EC Directive, Explanatory Memorandum, pp3-9.
89 Proposed EC Directive, p18.
90 Proposed EC Directive, pp23-24. (summary)
91 Proposed EC Directive p25. (summary)
92 Proposed EC Directive, Article 15.
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emission reduction objectives in its plan’.93 However there is no mention of emission scopes, so
it is unclear whether the emission reductions include all three scopes or whether there is a
more limited objective. There is also no obvious reference to ‘net zero’ or ‘offsets’ making it
unclear (at least on a quick glance) what the actual expectation is.
With regard to the materials listed in the Annex,94 and therefore subject to the due
diligence obligations, Part I, ‘violations of rights and prohibitions included in international
human rights agreements’, provides a list including as #18:
‘Violation of the prohibition of causing any measurable environmental degradation, such as
harmful soil change, water or air pollution, harmful emissions or excessive water
consumption or other impact on natural resources, that
(a) Impairs the natural bases for the preservation and production of food, or
(b) Denies a person access to safe and clean drinking water or
(c) Makes it difficult for a person to access sanitary facilities or destroys them or
(d) Harms the health, safety, the normal use of property or land or the normal conduct
of economic activity of a person or
(e) Affects ecological integrity, such as deforestation,
in accordance with Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 5 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 12 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.’ 95
This is followed in #19 by livelihood rights violations in relation to land, forests and waters, and
in #20 by Indigenous rights violations.
As someone who teaches environmental law in the domestic Canadian context, it is
difficult to know what to make of #18. Domestic environmental law is premised upon a
permissible approach to pollution – commonly described as ‘command and control’, whereby
companies seek permits to pollute in accordance with specified limits. It is difficult to
understand what would not be included here, but this would accord with a human rightsinformed approach to environmental justice.96 Obviously, domestic approaches to
environmental law are broken or we would not be in a situation of triple planetary crisis. Might
this provision be useful, or is it so broad as to be unimplementable in practice? (It does not of
course speak to the overconsumption issue.)
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Proposed EC Directive, Article 15.
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/1_2_183888_annex_dir_susta_en.pdf
95 Ibid #18
96 See for example Erin Daly and James R May, ‘The Indivisibility of Human Dignity and Sustainability’ in Sumudu
Atapattu, Carmen G. Gonzalez & Sara L Seck, co-editors, Cambridge Handbook of Environmental Justice and
Sustainable Development (CUP 2021) at 23-28; Carmen Gonzalez, Racial Capitalism and the Anthropocene in
Sumudu Atapattu, Carmen G. Gonzalez & Sara L Seck, co-editors, Cambridge Handbook of Environmental Justice
and Sustainable Development (CUP 2021) at 72-85.
94
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Part II, on the other hand, provides a separate list of ‘violations of internationally
recognized objectives and prohibitions included in environmental conventions.’ 97 While the first
item addresses biodiversity, and the second trade in endangered species, the rest focus on
discrete provisions in relation to toxic or hazardous substances. This may be reflective of the
limited number of binding international legal obligations that easily translate into business
responsibilities. By contrast with the (overly?) expansive nature of #18 in Part I, Part II seems
unnecessarily narrow. Both Parts suffer from a focus that is almost entirely on state-based
treaty law.
Another important dimension of the Directive is Article 25 which clarifies the duty of
care of directors. States are to ensure that directors of companies ‘take into account’ climate
change, human rights, and ‘environmental consequences including in the short, medium and
long term’ when ‘fulfilling their duty to act in the best interest of the company’.98 Much could
be said about both the importance and limitations of this kind of change. 99
Overall, while the objectives of mandatory HReDD legislation are laudatory, it is unclear
whether what is proposed in the EC Directive would lead to effective change at least with
regard to the human rights dimensions of triple planetary crisis. While this brief glance cannot
provide a fulsome assessment of this initiative or its broader context, my reading is that it does
not appear to have the potential to address the overconsumption problem, nor, importantly, is
it designed to. Indeed, the word consumption only appears twice (both in the explanatory
memorandum), and the problem of overconsumption (or excess emissions) is not identified.

5. Sustainable Development Goals
Unlike human rights-based corporate climate accountability litigation, or mandatory HReDD
legislation, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with its seventeen SDGs and 169
targets clearly does contemplate the problem of overconsumption.100 Sustainable development
is often thought to require the balancing of three pillars of economic development, social
development, and environmental protection, sometimes described as resembling a threelegged stool each supporting equal weight.101 Yet this vision of sustainable development is
highly problematic in that it fails to recognize the place of humanity within the biosphere,
endorsing a view of humans as separate from the environment. 102 Instead, environment must
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Proposed EC Directive Part II
Proposed EC Directive, Article 25.
99 See for example Beate Sjåfjell and Mark B. Taylor, “A Clash of Norms: Shareholder Primacy VS Sustainable
Corporate Purpose” (2019) 13:3 International & Comparative Corporate Law Journal 40-66.
100 UN General Assembly, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Oct 21, 2015,
UN Doc A/RES/70/1.
101 Sumudu Atapattu, Carmen G. Gonzalez & Sara L Seck, “Intersections of Environmental Justice and Sustainable
Development” in Sumudu Atapattu, Carmen G. Gonzalez & Sara L Seck, co-editors, Cambridge Handbook of
Environmental Justice and Sustainable Development (CUP 2021) 1-19 at 3-4.
102 Ibid at 4.
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be understood as the floor on which society and all economic activity must stand. 103 Critics of
the concept of sustainable development argue that it ‘fosters the illusion of unlimited economic
growth on a finite planet’ and is deployed by ‘global elites’ who ‘subordinate nature to the
imperatives of economic growth, while ignoring ecological limits and planetary boundaries.’ 104
The 2030 Agenda is, however, explicitly based on human rights,105 and close interrogation
of the social pillar of sustainable development should reveal useful frames for BHR.106 What
about overconsumption by the affluent? SDG 12 107 (Ensure sustainable consumption and
production patterns) perhaps holds promise with targets that include halving food waste, life
cycle approaches to managing chemicals and waste, substantially reducing waste through
‘prevention, reduction, recycling and reuse’, encouraging companies to adopt sustainable
practices and sustainability reporting, and ensuring ‘people everywhere have relevant
information and awareness for sustainable development and lifestyles in harmony with
nature.’108 According to the OHCHR, SDG 12 reflects human rights to health, adequate food,
safe drinking water, and the right of all peoples to freely dispose of their natural resources. 109
Yet there seems to be a disconnect between the nature of the problem and the solutions
proposed – while there doesn’t seem to be a down side to everyone learning about how to live
in harmony with nature, it does seem to sidestep the problematic reality of wealth inequity as
documented in studies such as that of Oxfam which found in 2019 that the poorest half of the
world’s population controlled as much wealth as 26 billionaires.110 It also seems
counterintuitive when read in light of SDG 1 which includes targets such as to ‘eradicate
extreme poverty for all people everywhere’ (defined as living on less than $1.25 per day), and
to ‘build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations and reduce their exposure
and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events’ etc.111 In short, the SDGs seem to have no
trouble identifying specific targets for the ‘poor’; why not be explicit about reduced
consumption targets for the ‘rich’?112
103

Ibid p5. Alternately, environment may be viewed as a ceiling of planetary boundaries which must not be
exceeded. See further (above and below) on resilience and the Anthropocene.
104 Ibid p5.
105 Ibid p5 (‘We envisage a world of universal respect for human rights and human dignity, the rule of law, justice,
equality and non-discrimination; of respect for race, ethnicity and cultural diversity; and of equal opportunity
permitting the full realization of human potential …’)
106 See for example Vijeyarasa, R., & Liu, M. (2022). Fast Fashion for 2030: Using the Pattern of the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) to Cut a More Gender-Just Fashion Sector. Business and Human Rights Journal, 7(1), 4566. doi:10.1017/bhj.2021.29; and JÄGERS, N. (2021). UN Guiding Principles at 10: Permeating Narratives or Yet
Another Silo? Business and Human Rights Journal, 6(2), 198-211. doi:10.1017/bhj.2021.9.
107 https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal12
108 SDG 12, Targets 12.3, 12.4, 12.5, 12.6, 12.8
109 https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/MDGs/Post2015/SDG_HR_Table.pdf
110 Atapattu et al, (supra note x) p6, citing Oxfam, ‘Public Good or Private Wealth’ Jan 2019, p12.
111 https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal1 SDG 1, Targets 1.1 and 1.5.
112 Of course, the poor are not treated as having agency in SDG 1, but rather the action is directed at others. For a
related discussion of outstanding research questions with regard to the relationship between sustainable
development and environmental justice, see Sumudu Atapattu, Carmen G. Gonzalez & Sara L Seck, “Beyond
Fragmentation: Reflections, Strategies and Challenges” in Sumudu Atapattu, Carmen G. Gonzalez & Sara L Seck, coeditors, Cambridge Handbook of Environmental Justice and Sustainable Development (CUP 2021) 470-476.
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A different but perhaps related concern is with Goal 8’s call to ‘Promote sustained,
inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work
for all’.113 Targets include to ‘[s]ustain per capita economic growth in accordance with national
circumstances’.114 This suggests an embrace of ‘economic growth’ for all despite movements
advocating for ‘sustainable degrowth’ in wealthy parts of the world so as to ‘meet basic human
needs and ensure a high quality of life, while reducing the ecological impact of the global
economy to a sustainable level, equitably distributed among nations.’115 Instead, Target 8.4
embraces the decoupling of economic growth and environmental degradation, through
improvements in ‘global resource efficiency in production and consumption’. 116 Yet while the
indicators listed point to the importance of material footprint analysis, SDG 8 similarly refrains
from explicitly highlighting the problem of overconsumption by individuals that are rich. 117
Similar concerns arise with regard to SDG 10 ‘Reduce inequality within and among
countries’.118 Target 10.1 is ‘[b]y 2030, progressively achieve and sustain income growth of the
bottom 40 per cent of the population at a rate higher than the national average’ with indicator
10.1.1 ‘[g]rowth rates of household expenditure or income per capita among the bottom 40 per
cent of the population and the total population.’119 Yet given the reality of triple planetary crisis
and planetary boundaries, why is there no explicit mention of the need for those in the top 10
percent at least to lower their income and expenditure (degrowth?) rather than continuing the
charade that we live on a planet with no ecological limits?
Notably, according to a Tweet by ecological economist Timothée Parrique on March 1,
2022, ‘degrowth’ is referenced multiple times in the IPCC’s latest report, although not in the
summary for policy-makers.120
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SDG 8 https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal8
SDG 8, Target 8.1. Indicator 8.1.1 is ‘Annual growth rate of real GDP per capita’.
115 Atapattu et al, (supra note x) pp6-7, citing the 2008 Degrowth Declaration adopted at the Economic Degrowth
for Ecological Sustainability and Social Equity Conference held in Paris in 2008.
116 SDG 8, Target 8.4. The framing arguably aligns with calls by UNEP for ‘green growth’. See generally Atapattu et
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117 SDG 8, Indicator 8.4.1 ‘Material footprint, material footprint per capita, and material footprint per GDP’;
Indicator 8.4.2 ‘Domestic material consumption, domestic material consumption per capita, and domestic material
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6. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
In this part I will consider whether responsible business conduct (RBC) as developed
through the work of the OECD might offer useful tools for addressing the overconsumption of
the rich problem. My analysis so far suggests the UNGPs have nothing obvious to offer on this
topic, and neither do the Principles of the UN Global Compact. 121 The OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises (OECD MNE Guidelines),122 on the other hand, appear to offer some
potential given that Chapter VIII is devoted to Consumer Interests.
The OECD MNE Guidelines and accompanying Due Diligence guidance tools 123 are promoted
to businesses by 50 adhering states124 each of which is required to establish a National Contact
Point (NCP) agency designed to both promote RBC and to hear specific instance complaints
using non-judicial grievance processes.125 While initially developed in the 1970s, the most
recent version of the OECD MNE Guidelines dates from 2011. Part I, General Concepts and
Principles, clarifies that expectations are the same for domestic and multinational enterprises,
and that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are encouraged to observe the MNE
Guidelines as much as possible given their capacity.126 For all enterprises, the first obligation is
to obey domestic law, with the OECD MNE Guidelines often extending beyond the law. 127
Should domestic laws conflict with any standards or principles, enterprises are expected to seek
to honour them to the fullest extent without violating domestic law, and governments of
adhering or third countries are encouraged to co-operate in good faith to resolve such
conflicts.128 Part II, General Policies, confirms the expectation that enterprises should both take
into account policies in the countries in which they operate and take into account the views of
stakeholders.129 In addition to contributing to sustainable development and respecting human
rights, as well as developing effective practices of self-regulation and management, enterprises
are expected to carry out “risk-based due diligence” so as to “identify, prevent and mitigate
actual and potential impacts” and to “account for how those impacts are addressed” with the
“nature and extent of due diligence depend[ing] on the circumstances of a particular
situation”.130 Going beyond the human rights focus of the UNGPs, the expectation is for risk121

Neither the human rights nor environment principles of the UNGC appear to provide guidance on this point (see
generally https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles), although to the extent that UNGP
members align with the SDGs there will be expectations regarding overproduction, overconsumption, circular
economy, etc (see generally https://www.unglobalcompact.org/take-action/action/sdg-blueprint ) Indeed, a
search for ‘overconsumption’ pulled up 75 references in Communications on Progress, while ‘overproduction’
pulled up a mere 63. Circular economy pulled up close to 3000, including in UNGC websites (14) and news stories
(13). Close to 5500 Communications on progress referenced life cycle assessment, with news (4) and a website (1).
122 https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf
123 https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/duediligence/
124 https://www.oecd.org/investment/mne/oecddeclarationanddecisions.htm
125 https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/ncps/
126 OECD MNE Guidelines p18, paras 5-6.
127 OECD MNE Guidelines p17, para 2.
128 OECD MNE Guidelines pp17-18, paras 2 & 8.
129 OECD MNE Guidelines p19.
130 OECD MNE Guidelines pp19-20, paras 1, 2, 7, and 10.
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based due diligence to be conducted in relation to matters covered by other chapters of the
OECD MNE Guidelines.131 This means that enterprises need to “[a]void causing or contributing
to adverse impacts” “through their own activities, and address such impacts when they occur”,
and also “[s]eek to prevent or mitigate an adverse impact where they have not contributed to
that impact, when the impact is nevertheless directly linked to their operations, products or
services by a business relationship.”132 Enterprises should also encourage business partners to
apply RBC principles, including sub-contractors and suppliers, and should “[e]ngage with
relevant stakeholders in order to provide meaningful opportunities for their views to be taken
into account in relation to planning and decision making for projects or other activities that may
significantly impact local communities.”133 MNEs that are state-owned (SOEs) are also subject
to the OECD MNE Guidelines.134 A crucial component of RBC due diligence under the OECD
MNE Guidelines is for due diligence to go “beyond simply identifying and managing materials
risks to the enterprise itself, to include the risks of adverse impacts related to matters covered
by the Guidelines”135 including risks to rights holders.136
Chapter IV on Human Rights replicates the responsibility to respect human rights and so
does not offer more that the UNGPs. Other potentially relevant chapters to the
overconsumption issue are Chapter III (Disclosure), Chapter VI (Environment), and Chapter VIII
(Consumer Interests).
The disclosure chapter confirms the need for enterprises to ensure timely disclosure of
accurate material information on enterprise activities including where appropriate for
geographic areas or business lines.137 Enterprise disclosure policies should include information
on risk factors that are foreseeable, as well as ‘issues regarding workers and other
stakeholders’.138 Businesses are encouraged to publicly communicate additional information
including on matters relating to the OECD MNE Guidelines or other codes of conduct, ‘internal
audit, risk management, and legal compliance systems’, as well as information regarding
stakeholder and worker relationships.139 Non-financial disclosure, including social and
environmental reporting should be undertaken in accordance with high quality reporting
standards, and the standards or policies themselves should be reported. 140
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Beyond disclosure to shareholders, enterprise information is important to local
communities, workers, governments, special interest groups, and society at large.141 Businesses
should operate transparently and be responsive to public demands for information. 142
Disclosure is important for non-traded enterprises, whether privately held or State-owned
(SOEs).143 The scope of information communicated to the public particularly with regard to
environmental matters extends to activities of suppliers, contractors, or joint venture partners,
particularly with regard to transfer of environmentally harmful activities. 144 Information should
be communicated so as to be easily accessible, with particular attention to access by directly
affected poorer communities. 145
The environment chapter highlights the need for enterprises to take account of
environmental protection while operating in accordance with relevant domestic and
international law and policy and contributing to contribute to sustainable development. 146 To
do so, businesses need to have environmental management systems in place that collect and
evaluate environmental and health and safety (EHS) impacts in a timely fashion. 147 Measurable
objectives and targets for improving environmental performance and utilization of resources
should be established, consistent with national and international commitments. They should be
reviewed periodically and subject to regular monitoring and verification of progress.148
The environment chapter also calls upon businesses to provide both workers and the
public with timely information on potential EHS impacts of enterprise activities, and to engage
in timely consultation with directly affected communities.149 Foreseeable EHS impacts
associated with the full life cycle of enterprise processes, goods and services should be assessed
and addressed in decision-making, with the aim of avoiding impacts, and mitigating those that
are unavoidable. Where impacts may be significant, an environmental impact assessment
should be prepared.150 A precautionary approach should be adopted, 151 and contingency plans
should be in place for ‘preventing, mitigating, and controlling serious’ EHS damage, including in
case of emergencies and accidents, with attention to ‘immediate reporting to the competent
authorities’.152 Businesses should aim for continuous improvement of corporate environmental
performance by the enterprise and through the supply chain, including through the
development of products that ‘can be reused, recycled, or disposed of safely’, through the
promotion of consumer awareness of the environmental impacts of enterprise products, and
through the development of strategies for the ‘substitution or reduction of use of toxic
141
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147 OECD MNE Guidelines at p42, para 1.
148 OECD MNE Guidelines p42, para 1.
149 OECD MNE Guidelines p42, para 2.
150 OECD MNE Guidelines p43, para 3.
151 OECD MNE Guidelines p43, para 4.
152 OECD MNE Guidelines p43, para 5.
142

pg. 20

substances’, among others.153 The environment chapter further calls upon businesses to
educate and train workers in EHS matters, including in relation to hazardous materials, as well
as environmental management, impact assessment, the prevention of accidents, and public
relations.154 Finally, businesses should contribute to public policy development so as to
enhance environmental protection and awareness.155
The Consumer Interests chapter lays out the expectation that enterprises should ensure
the quality of goods and services and should act fairly in marketing and advertising.156 Goods
and services should not only meet consumer health and safety standards, but also take into
consideration “the needs of vulnerable and disadvantaged consumers.” 157 Accurate and clear
information about environmental attributes and disposal, including recyclability of products
should be provided to consumers to enable them to make informed decisions. 158 Enterprises
should also support consumer education so that consumers can make informed decisions about
complex goods, better understand the environmental and social impacts of their choices, and
“support sustainable consumption.” 159 Enterprises are expected to fully co-operate with public
officials in order to prevent or diminish serious public health and safety or environmental
threats “deriving from the consumption, use or disposal” of business goods and services.160
While there are glimmers of hope in terms of reference to supporting consumer
education, promoting environmental awareness, and non-financial disclosure, there does not
appear to be anything that clearly points to a need for businesses to play a role in addressing
the problem of overconsumption by the affluent. There are also arguably concerns with the
consumer education angle, as critiques of precautionary consumption point out that it often
places the burden to reduce (toxins) within the household on feminized labour. 161
It is beyond the scope of this paper to delve in detail into the OECD’s extensive due
diligence guidance tools for RBC.162 However, in December 2021, the OECD published a paper
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designed to provide a snapshot of how OECD RBC instruments address global environmental
challenges.163 The paper emphasizes the importance of an environmental human rights
approach,164 introduces circular economy initiatives,165 and provides an overview of OECD
National Contact Point (NCP) cases.166 It describes key provisions in the OECD MNE Guidelines
and explores how they have been interpreted in select NCP decisions. 167 The paper
subsequently explores OECD due diligence instruments and select sector-specific guidance168
and concludes by introducing policy trends including mandatory human rights and
environmental due diligence, as well as anti-waste and circular economy law and policy. 169
Annex A provides a comprehensive overview of NCP cases that have referred to the
environment chapter.170 Notably for the purpose of this paper, there are 14 references to
‘consumption’ in the paper, and much attention is given to the importance of circular economy
initiatives.171 However, again, there is no specific finger pointing to the consumption patterns of
the affluent.

7. Lessons for BHR from Environmental Human Rights (EHR)
It is common for environmental issues to be treated as distinct from human rights issues,
but increasingly these conversations are coming together. Indeed, in October 2021, the UN
Human Rights Council passed a resolution recognizing ‘the right to a clean, healthy and
sustainable environment as a human right that is important for the enjoyment of human
rights.’172 It further notes that the right is ‘related to other rights and existing international law,’
and affirms that the promotion of the right requires ‘the full implementation of the multilateral
environmental agreements under the principles of international environmental law.’173 To this
end the resolution ‘encourages’ states to build capacities to protect the environment in order
to fulfil all of their human rights obligations, as well as to enhance cooperation with others
including: states; the OHCHR; the rest of the UN system; relevant regional actors; as well as
relevant non-states stakeholders such as civil society, national human rights institutions, and
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business.174 Additionally states are encouraged to share good practices, adopt policies for the
enjoyment of the right with respect to biodiversity and ecosystems, and to take the right into
account while implementing and following up on the SDGs.175 The preambular language to the
resolution recalls that the UNGPs ‘underscore the responsibility of all business enterprises to
respect human rights, including the rights to liberty and security of human rights defenders
working in environmental matters, referred to as environmental human rights defenders’. 176 It
also notes that ‘more than 155 States have recognized some form of a right to a healthy
environment’ whether in national constitutions, policies, legislation, or international
agreements.177
This resolution is not, however, the full story of environmental human rights 178 Of note for
this paper is the work of Special Rapporteurs on human rights and the environment whose
work has clarified the nature of existing environmental human rights. These reports often make
reference to business responsibilities while also clarifying state duties and draw upon a fulsome
range of sources of international human rights and environmental law.179
For example, following an extensive process of mapping environmental human rights in
international law,180 the 2018 Framework Principles for Human Rights and the Environment
consist of sixteen Principles largely aimed at clarifying state obligations. 181 The commentary to
the first and second Framework Principles clarifies the interdependence of environment and
human rights: without a ‘safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment’ it is impossible to
fully enjoy a vast range of human rights, including rights to life, health, food, water, and
development; yet in order to protect the environment, it is vital to exercise human rights
including rights to information, freedom of expression and association, participation and
remedy.182 Principle 12 confirms ‘States should ensure environmental standards are effectively
enforced against both public and private actors’.183 Paragraph 35 of the Commentary clarifies
that the business responsibility to respect human rights in accordance with the UNGPs applies
to adverse human rights impacts that arise through environmental harm, and that beyond
compliance with environmental laws, businesses should respect human rights through
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environmental protection and remediation of adverse environmental human rights impacts
they cause or to which they contribute. 184
The Framework Principles treat non-discrimination as a cross-cutting theme.185 Principle 14
elaborates upon the need for additional measures in relation to ‘those who are most vulnerable
to, or at particular risk from, environmental harm.’ Vulnerability may arise due to the unusual
susceptibility of some individuals to environmental harm, or due to a denial of their human
rights, or both.186 Those most vulnerable or at risk include women, older persons, the disabled,
those living in poverty, racialized minorities, displaced persons and children. 187 Principle 15
elaborates the particular obligations owed by states in relation to Indigenous peoples and
‘members of traditional communities’.
Principles 4-10 of the Framework Principles clarify the content of procedural environmental
human rights: 188
o Access to information on environmental matters that may undermine rights (Principle 7)
o Prior assessment of possible environmental impacts of proposed projects and policies
including effects on human rights (Principle 8)
o Freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and association with regard to environmental
matters (Principle 5) as well as a safe space for environmental human rights defenders that
is free from harassment, threats, intimidation, and violence (Principle 4)
o Effective public participation in environmental decision-making for all (Principle 9)
o Access to effective remedies for violations of environmental human rights, including both
violations of procedural rights and substantive rights (Principle 10)
Notably, Principle 6 provides that ‘States should provide for education and public awareness
on environmental matters’, with the Commentary drawing specific attention to the ‘education
of the child’ but also continuing to adulthood ‘[t]o ensure that adults as well as children
understand environmental effects on their health and well-being’.189 The aim is to build public
capacity to ‘understand environmental challenges and policies’, so that they may fully exercise
the full range of their environmental rights. Yet there is no reference to the need to educate
the public, especially affluent adults, of the harms to human rights that arise from
overconsumption patterns. While Principle 16 of the Framework Principles provides that ‘States
should respect, protect and fulfil human rights in the actions they take to address
environmental challenges and pursue sustainable development’, there is no specific reference
184
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to SDGs that touch on overconsumption. Instead, the message is that the pursuance of
environmental and developmental goals in accordance with human rights norms both
promotes human dignity and strengthens policymaking.
The overarching substantive right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment are
subdivided into specific issue areas which have received the attention of the current Special
Rapporteur in dedicated reports. 190 These are rights: to breathe clean air; to a safe climate; to
safe, sufficient water and healthy freshwater ecosystems; to healthy and sustainably produced
food; to non-toxic environments in which to live, work, study or play; and to healthy
biodiversity and ecosystems. Consumption is briefly referenced in some of the reports,
including the need to reduce consumption of some food items.191 Specific mention of the
problem is made in the report on biodiversity, noting first that ‘[w]ealthy people are
disproportionately responsible for overconsumption and pressure on nature’, and identifying
agriculture as the ‘largest single factor in the destruction of ecosystems and the decline of
biological diversity’.192 Paragraph 82 of the conclusions is directly on point:
82. Transforming society to achieve a good quality of life for all in harmony with nature
requires scaling up biodiversity conservation, large-scale restoration of degraded
ecosystems, a rapid clean energy transition, shifting to a circular economy, decreased
material consumption by wealthy individuals and reforming supply chains to reduce
environmental impacts. Employing a rights-based approach could serve as a catalyst for
accelerated action. History demonstrates – through the progress achieved by abolitionists,
suffragettes, civil rights activists and indigenous peoples – the powerful role of human rights
in sparking transformative societal changes.193 [emphasis added]

8. Conclusions: Transformative Thinking for Equity & Resilience
This paper has explored the relationship between BHR, triple planetary crisis, and the
problem of overconsumption by the ‘rich’. My key argument is that the issue of
overconsumption by the affluent is relevant to BHR, given that the human rights impacts of the
triple planetary crisis are intimately connected to overconsumption. While the RDS corporate
climate litigation and the newly proposed EC Directive have generated excitement, I argue that
it is not clear that either speaks to the overconsumption problem. While the SDGs do consider
responsible consumption and production, I argue that the approach is not sufficient, failing to
draw clear attention to overconsumption by the wealthy. While OECD RBC guidance offers
supplementary entry points into the overconsumption conversation, they too fall short despite
attention to the role of the consumer and the importance of circular economy as complements
to the integration of BHR into RBC.
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The work of Special Rapporteurs on human rights and environment offer food for thought
on pathways forward. Access to education about environmental human rights, together with a
fulsome understanding of procedural environmental human rights, creates necessary space for
those most vulnerable to harm to exercise their rights. But creating space to act on
environmental human rights concerns without at the same time drawing attention to the
responsibility of wealthy individuals to reduce consumption (which, even if ‘green’ is most
certainly beyond ‘fair share’) places the burden of guardianship to save the planet on those
who are already burdened due to both colonialism and ecological crisis. This is not surprising,
given the general failure of individual ‘rights’ talk to embrace individual responsibilities. There
are good reasons to avoid a push away from business responsibilities to individual
responsibilities, and I am not suggesting this. Rather, my claim is that the affluent are not just
any individuals. This is particularly so for the 1%.194
The importance of not just of responsibility, but of reciprocal responsibilities between
humans and non-humans, is evident if attention is paid to the justifications given by members
of Indigenous communities, often women, who serve as land and water defenders. While
Indigenous laws are unique to each nation, Anishnaabe scholar Deborah McGregor observes
that ‘Indigenous legal traditions reflect a set of reciprocal relationships and a coexistence with
the natural world. Balanced relationships are sought between humans and other entities in the
natural world (animals, plants, birds, forests, waters, etc.) as well as with the ancestors and
future generations.’195 It is curious, then, that environmental human rights frameworks and
BHR acknowledge the need for environmental human rights defenders, including Indigenous
land and water protectors, to have a safe space in which to exercise their rights, but does not
contemplate placing responsibilities on wealthy individuals to reduce their overconsumption
patterns even as it is evident that this conduct unnecessarily places burdens on defenders.
It may be that BHR simply cannot grapple effectively with the overconsumption problem.
Alternately, perhaps the problem is in part, as I have argued in other work, that dominant
voices need to rethink assumptions about who the human is who holds human rights, as well as
who the humans are who contribute to the business enterprise. If workers, shareholders,
members of corporate boards, and wealthy individuals were all understood to be what I have
described196 as ecologically embedded relational individuals – differentially situated – then
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perhaps the transformational conversations about both human rights and environmental
responsibilities would not seem so challenging.
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